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THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD:
THE OBLIGATION OF STATE COURTS
TO PAY FOR INTERPRETERS FOR
DEAF LITIGANTS
INTRODUCTION
Approximately 24 million deaf and hard of hearing people
live in the United States,1 many of whom do not communicate
through the exchange of spoken words. Instead, depending on
a number of factors such as severity of hearing loss, age of
onset, parental attitudes, education, and cultural identifica-
tion,2 deaf individuals generally rely on visual forms of commu-
nication to understand and to make themselves understood by
the hearing world.'
Consequently, most deaf people cannot comprehend situa-
tions where others use spoken language as the sole medium of
communication unless that communication is somehow made
visible.4 In situations involving legal rights, it is especially
1 Michael F. Kelleher, The Confidentiality of Criminal Conversations on
TDD Relay Systems, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1349 (1991) (citing S. REP. NO. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1989)).
2 There has been a distinction between the term "deaf' referring to
audiological deafness, and the term "Deaf," referring to sociological deafness.
Many regard deaf individuals not as suffering from a pathology, but rather as
belonging to a distinct cultural and linguistic minority. See JAMES WOOD-
WARD, How You GONNA GET TO HEAVEN IF You CAN'T TALK WITH JESUS: ON
DEPATHOLOGIZING DEAFNESS 1 (1982).
' While some deaf people are exceptionally skilled at lip-reading, many
communicate primarily through one of the manual languages. 'Very few
people can read lips well enough to understand speech, even under optimum
conditions. Information collected during the 1972 National Census of the Deaf
Population indicated that 21.4 percent of deaf adults who completed one or
more years of senior high school considered their lip-reading ability to be poor
to nonexistent." SY DUBOW ET AL., LEGAL RIGHTS: THE GUIDE FOR DEAF AND
HARD OF HEARING PEOPLE 6 (4th ed. 1992) (noting J. ScHEIN AND M. DELK,
THE DEAF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 63 (1974)).
4 For those deaf persons who use a manual language, a sign language
interpreter changes spoken words and concepts into signs, and vice versa. In
the United States, deaf people use several different sign languages including:
American Sign Language (ASL), which is considered to be the language of the
Deaf community and has a unique, visually-based structure; Signed Exact
English (SEE), which is an exact replication of spoken English in signs; pidgin
Signed English, which establishes a middle ground between ASL and SEE by
using a mixture of American Sign Language vocabulary and English syntax;
and Cued Speech, which makes use of simple hand positions near the mouth
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critical that information is readily understandable to deaf
individuals. Recognizing this problem as early as 1925, Judge
Bricken of the Alabama Court of Appeals wrote:
In the absence of an interpreter, it would be a physical
impossibility for [a deaf individual] to know or under-
stand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.., he could only stand by helplessly... without
knowing or understanding, and all this in the teeth of
the mandatory constitutional rights which apply.'
While courts may acknowledge the special needs of deaf liti-
gants, some states do not take the additional critical step of
paying for an interpreter to assist the deaf litigant. The provi-
sion of an interpreter in the courtroom does not guarantee the
deaf individual equal access to the court unless the state bears
the expense of that interpreter. Still, twenty-six6 of forty-nine'
state statutes addressing the provision of interpreters for deaf
litigants in court proceedings declare that, when an interpreter
is provided for a deaf litigant in a civil suit, the interpreter's
fees will be paid by one or more of the parties as the court may
direct, or may be taxed as costs of court.8
to clarify different sounds that look alike to a lip-reader. OLIVER SACKS,
SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 23, 29-30, 70-71
& n.74 (Pan Books Ltd. 1991) (1989).
For deaf people who do not use a signed language, other accommodations
are available, including oral interpreters, computer aided transcription (real-
time captioning), assistive listening systems and, occasionally, the process of
writing back and forth. DUBOW et al., supra note 3, at 2-5, 77, 191-94.
5 Terry v. State of Alabama, 105 So. 386, 388 (Ala. App. 1925).
6 The following states allow their courts to consider interpreter fees as
litigation expenses in civil cases: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The
District of Columbia has a similar statute. The National Center For Law and
Deafness, Summary of State Interpreter Laws (August 1991) (unpublished, on
file with the National Center for Law and Deafness) [hereinafter State
Interpreter Laws Summary].
' While Alaska does not have a statute regarding court sign language
interpreters, the Department of Justice has ordered state courts to provide
interpreters for deaf parties at the expense of the State. Id. at 1.
8 State statutes regarding relating to interpreter fees in civil cases can be
divided into three categories. First, twelve states provide that interpreter fees
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Part I of this article provides an overview of legislation
affecting deaf litigants and argues that those state laws that
permit courts to allocate interpreter fees to deaf litigants or to
tax them as court costs violate Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, ("ADA")9 and the Department of Jus-
tice regulations implementing the ADA"0 as well as the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. Based on this argument, the article
analyzes the potential constitutional and non-constitutional
arguments states may offer in attempting to prevent the appli-
cation of federal law to their courtrooms. Part II discusses the
remedies and enforcement mechanisms available to deaf liti-
gants under the ADA. Part III presents public policy consider-
ations for requiring states to provide and pay for interpreters
and other auxiliary aides and services for deaf litigants in civil
cases.
11
I. LEGISLATION AFFECTING DEAF LITIGANTS
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
Almost twenty years ago, Congress expressed a commit-
ment to eliminate discrimination" against individuals with
disabilities by enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabil-
"will be paid by the appointing authority" or by "funds available to the
court/agency." Although such statutes guarantee that the court will pay the
interpreter, the statutes do not prohibit courts from determining the inter-
preter fees to be a court expense, and taxing the litigants accordingly. Second,
twenty-six states provide that the courts may tax interpreter fees as court
costs, so that one or more of the litigants bear the expense. State Interpreter
Laws Summary, supra note 6. Third, Pennsylvania's statute provides that in
a civil case, the court may appoint an interpreter and allocate the costs at the
discretion of the court. Under the Pennsylvania statute, an interpreter is not
required in a civil case. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7103(A) (Supp. 1992).
' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. H 1990) and 47
U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. I 1990)).
'0 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1992).
" For the purposes of this article, the term "interpreter" will include all
auxiliary aids and services for deaf litigants. For a list of other auxiliary aids
and services, see supra note 4.
' The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination by federal employers and
contractors, as well as all entities that are recipients of federal financial
assistance.
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itation Act"). 13 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act embodies
this commitment by providing:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ...
shall,... solely by reason of her or his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.' 4
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987"s amended sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by attempting to explain the
scope of the phrase "program or activity"'6 as particular opera-
tions of departments, entities of state or local governments,
colleges and universities, education systems, or entire corpora-
tions. 7 While the amendment was intended to clarify the lan-
13 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988)).
1' 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
15 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988).
16 Prior to the Restoration Act amendments, there was much debate over
the interpretation of the term "program or activity." Three Supreme Court
cases - Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), and United States Dep't of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986) - defined "program or
activity" to also restrict coverage under the civil rights acts to an unprecedent-
ed extent.
Prior to Grove City College, courts and commentators generally assumed
that a broad interpretation of "program or activity" was correct: all parts of
an institution were subject to § 504 if any part received federal financial
assistance for any purpose. Marc Charmatz & Sarah Geer, Program Specifici-
ty and Section 504: Making the Best of a Bad Situation, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1431, 1434-35 (1987).
17 Section 4 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 states:
For the purposes of this section, the term 'program or activity'
means all of the operations of:
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes
such assistance and each such department or agency (and each
other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is
extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
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guage of the Rehabilitation Act, it was not wholly successful, as
the definition of "program or activity" still remains a subject of
substantial litigation. In this litigation, many entities argue
that their programs or activities do not receive federal financial
assistance, and therefore that they are not obligated under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to provide accommodations
for individuals with disabilities. The outcome of such litigation
has been mixed."8
More recently, in the ADA, signed into law in July 1990,
Congress reiterated the commitment it made in the Rehabilita-
tion Act by stating that the purpose of the ADA is "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities .... ,
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA's anti-discrimination
provisions reach beyond programs and activities that receive
federal funding. Under Title H of the ADA, all "services, pro-
grams, and activities" of state and local governments must
provide equal access to individuals with disabilities."0 The
ADA represents a significant change because traditionally,
litigants have had difficulty proving that entities are recipients
(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a
public system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency ... , system of vocational education
or other school system;
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organiza-
tion, or an entire sole proprietorship.. : ;
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate
facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case
of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole
partnership; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the
entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
18 See, e.g., Bonner v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 714 F. Supp. 420 (D.
Ariz. 1989); Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 695 F. Supp. 1414
(E.D.N.Y. 1988).
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (Supp. H 1990).
o Section 202 of Title H, Subtitle A- "Prohibition Against Discrimination
and Other Generally Applicable Provisions" - provides that "subject to the
provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. H 1990). Other
sections of the ADA require equal access to employment opportunities, public
accommodations, and telecommunications services.
19921 209
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of federal financial assistance and thus are within the reach of
the Rehabilitation Act.
The ADA and its accompanying regulations include state
judicial systems in their broad definition of "public entity.122
On July 26, 1991, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued the
regulations and analysis to Title II that clarify this definition by
noting that "[Tlitle II applies to anything a public entity
does ... [it] is not limited to 'Executive agencies,' but includes
activities of the... judicial branches of State and local govern-
ments."23 The DOJ regulations specifically dictate that:
A public entity may not place a surcharge on a partic-
ular individual with a disability or any group of indi-
viduals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures,
such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program
accessibility, that are required to provide that individu-
al or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment
required by the Act or this part.'
2 For cases dealing with the issue of the federal financial assistance
requirement, see Moore v. Sun Bank of N. Florida, 923 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir.
1991) (discussing whether national bank's participation in Small Business
Administration's guaranteed loan program constitutes receipt of federal
financial assistance); Locascio v. City of St. Petersburg, 731 F. Supp. 1522
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (discussing whether construction of stadium is part of
federally funded project which was "program or activity" subject to Rehabili-
tation Act); Bonner v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 714 F. Supp. 420 (9th Cir.
1989) (discussing whether prison's receipt of federal aid brings it within reach
of Rehabilitation Act, even if plaintiff's particular program does not receive
federal money).
22 Section 201 of Title II defines "Public Entity" as: "(A) any State or local
government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government ...... 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(1) (Supp. II 1990).
' 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1992) (interpreting 28 C.F.R. § 35.102) (empha-
sis added).
2 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (1992). Furthermore, the regulatory Analysis to
paragraph (f) explains: "The Department has already recognized that imposi-
tion of the cost of courtroom interpreter services is impermissible under
section 504." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1992). The analysis of the
Department's § 504 regulation for its federally assisted programs states that
where a court system has an obligation to provide qualified interpreters, it
"has the corresponding responsibility to pay for the services of the interpreter."
Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs, 45
Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,630 (1980).
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Federal law clearly provides that a state that refuses to provide
and pay for an interpreter in a civil action acts in a discrimina-
tory manner.
B. ELEMENTS OF A DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER THE ADA
In order to prove discrimination under the ADA, a claimant
must first show that she is "a qualified individual(s) with a
disability."25 The regulations define "disability" as "a physi-
cal.., impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of... [an] individual.126 The regulations
further provide that the term "physical impairment" specifically
includes "speech and hearing impairments."' Thus, a deaf
claimant is considered to be an individual with a disability
under the ADA.
Once an individual's disability has been established, the
ADA requires that the individual be "qualified" to participate in
or receive the benefits of a program or activity. The ADA
defines a "qualified individual with a disability"2 as:
[Ain individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practices,
the removal of architectural [or] communication...
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity.29
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. H 1990).
26 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1992). Other definitions of disability include an
individual who has a record of such an impairment or who is regarded as
having such an impairment. Id.
27 28 C.F.R- § 35.104 (1992).
' The notion of a "qualified individual with a disability" first appears in
the Rehabilitation Act. Courts have interpreted the term to mean that
individuals are qualified if they meet all of the program's requirements
despite their disability, or with reasonable accommodations. See DeLong v.
Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (deaf individual is "otherwise
qualified" to serve as a juror despite her deafness if sign language interpreter
services are provided). See also Strathie v. Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, 716 F.2d 227, 230-31 (3rd Cir. 1983); Nelson v. Thornburgh,
567 F. Supp. 369, 378-81 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1984).
2942 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. H 1990).
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A deaf litigant attempting to obtain state-paid interpreter
services is qualified to participate in the "program or activity"
merely by her involvement in a civil suit in state court. In
summary, state court systems are covered by the ADA, and deaf
persons who participate in state court litigation may avail
themselves of the ADA's protection.
While the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act both explicitly
require state courts to provide auxiliary aids to deaf litigants in
civil proceedings, 0 twenty-six state statutes31 permit their
courts to assign the costs of an interpreter to one or more of the
parties, including the deaf litigant. The discriminatory element
is actualized when a judge uses her discretion to allocate the
interpreter fees to the deaf litigant, or taxes the fees as court
costs. Consequently, while most state statutes mandate the
presence of interpreters in the courtroom, this is not sufficient
to guarantee equal access to the judicial system. 3 To ensure
equal access, the ADA requires state judicial systems to provide
and pay for sign language interpreters for deaf parties in civil
cases.
33
C. STATES' REACTION TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
ADA TO THEIR COURTS
Although Congress intended the ADA, as well as the Reha-
bilitation Act, to apply to the states, states are likely to attempt
to prevent the application of these federal laws to their
courts.34 As previously discussed, Title II defines "public enti-
." See supra text accompanying note 24.
31 See supra note 6.
See supra note 8.
3 Interestingly, only two deaf individuals have sued state court systems to
require those systems to pay for interpreter fees under the Rehabilitation Act.
Avraham v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Herrold
v. Duckett, No. 92-CV-1698 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 1992). Two possible explanations
account for this. First, the traditional difficulty in proving that a court system
receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act presents a block to such litigation. Second, most state civil statutes leave
the assessment of interpreter fees to the judge's discretion, and, in many
instances, judges have not chosen to assess those fees against the deaf litigant.
Often, the individual's attorney will request this. Telephone Interview with
Marc Charmatz, Attorney, National Association of the Deaf Legal Defense
Fund (Oct. 31, 1991).
4 See, e.g., Avraham v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa
THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
ty" to include "any State"; 5 and the Department of Justice
regulations specify that "[T]itle I... extends the prohibition of
discrimination... to all activities of State governments." 6
Section 502 of the ADA asserts that "[a] State shall not be
immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States from an action in Federal or State court ...
for a violation of this chapter."3 " Despite such explicit lan-
guage, states may argue that the federal government, through
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, should not be permitted to
dictate the operations of state and local judicial systems. In
addition, states may forward the following legal arguments to
support their claim that the ADA should not apply to their
programs.
States may first argue that our system of government
places limits on federal power and that these limits should
prohibit the application of federal law to state court procedure.
These limitations include the Tenth Amendment and the Feder-
al Anti-Injunction Act, as well as the doctrines of federalism and
comity.
Expansive readings of the Necessary and Proper Clause and
the Commerce Clause have all but relegated the Tenth
Amendment, designed to protect the states from an overreach-
ing federal government," to a nominal status. From 1976 to
1985, the Tenth Amendment was imbued with substantial
practical significance by the Supreme Court decision in National
League of Cities v. Usury. 9 In 1985, however, the Court re-
versed itself in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority," which explicitly overruled National League of
1991).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (Supp. II 1990).
3 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Govern-
ment, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,694 (1991).
37 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (Supp. H 1990) (footnote omitted). Additionally, § 502
of the ADA states, "In any action against a State for a violation of the require-
ments of this chapter, remedies... are available... to the same extent as
such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any
public or private entity other than a State." Id.
' The Tenth Amendment states that "The Powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. Y.
'9 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (barring application of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) to state and municipal employees).
40 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding application of the FLSA to municipally
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Cities." Nevertheless, in attempting to invoke the protection
of the Tenth Amendment, states may argue that courtroom
procedures lie near the heart of state sovereignty, and as such
the Tenth Amendment should protect these procedures from
federal intervention. Yet, so long as Garcia stands, states are
unlikely to find sympathy in federal courts.
The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between federal
supremacy and state sovereignty through the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments, the Supremacy Clause,42 the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Maintaining this
balance within the judiciary, federal courts will sometimes
refrain from interfering in state courts under the doctrines of
federalism and comity. The Supreme Court described federal-
ism as "the fundamental constitutional independence of the
States and their courts,"43 and defined comity as "a proper
respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state govern-
ments, and a continuance of the belief that their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways."
44
States may argue that Title II of the ADA offends the
notions of federalism and comity by allowing the federal govern-
ment to regulate the legislative, executive, and judicial functions
owned and operated mass-transit systems).
41 Garcia resulted from Justice Blackmun's change of heart regarding the
application of the FLSA to state employees. The Garcia opinion refers to the
problems encountered by the Court in trying to distinguish between tradition-
al and non-traditional government functions. Unable to produce a workable
standard, the majority overturned National League of Cities, and in doing so,
destroyed virtually all practical significance of the Tenth Amendment.
42 U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
4 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 286-287 (1970).
4Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); See also Judice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975). The
Younger Court also explained that the concepts of federalism and comity
represent "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. at 44. See generally MICHAEL WELLS, THE ROLE OF CoMITY IN THE LAW
OF FEDERAL CouRTs, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 59 (1981).
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of state and local governments. 5 States may also argue that
the Federal Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from
interfering with state proceedings.46
Currently, however, these limitations provide few meaning-
ful checks on the power of the federal government, and do not
secure states' abilities to perform their traditional functions free
from federal interference. Other federal laws, such as the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),47 which
are similar in scope to the ADA, have survived similar state
federalism challenges. For example, in John H. v. Brunelle,4
a plaintiff brought suit against several defendants, including the
State of New Hampshire, for alleged violations of the EAHCA.
The New Hampshire District Court held that the plaintiff could
sue the state in federal court under the EAHCA, and further
decided that an investigation of state statutes in a federal court
forum was permissible.49  "A determination of whether the
EAHCA has been violated, must necessarily involve an inquiry
regarding the state statutes promulgated in response to the
federal mandate. A court cannot discuss the EAHCA in a
vacuum but must look to the state statutes as an integral part
of its inquiry."5
4' Federal courts are likely to reject such arguments by finding congressio-
nal authority for the application of the ADA to state programs in the Com-
merce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that a motel that refused to
rent rooms to blacks could constitutionally be reached by the Civil Rights Act
under the Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(holding that a restaurant that served mostly local patrons could still be
reached by the Civil Rights Act through the Commerce Clause).
46 The Federal Anti-Injunction Act provides in relevant part: "A court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1988); This statute was designed to avert needless friction between
state and federal courts. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1972).
47 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485, now the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).
4' 631 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.H. 1986).
49 1d.
' Id. at 212. Similarly, in Association of Retarded Citizens of North
Dakota v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983), state officials appealed a
district court decision ordering them to rectify violations of federal and state
constitutional and statutory rights of mentally retarded citizens. The state
defendants petitioned the court to abstain, claiming that the exercise of federal
1992] 215
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This case and others5 indicate that federalism-based chal-
lenges to Title II of the ADA are likely to be unsuccessful. More
significant, however, is a recent motion in the case of Avraham
v. Zaffarano."2 Plaintiff Avraham brought suit against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as well as a Pennsylvania
claims court judge for failure to provide and pay for interpreter
services for his small claims action. Pennsylvania law permit-
ted the judge to use her discretion in assessing interpreter fees
against a deaf individual.53 The state defendants brought a
motion to dismiss based on federalism grounds, but this chal-
lenge was unsuccessful and the plaintiff's discrimination claim
survived the motion to dismiss. From this decision and similar
cases under other federal laws,' it is unlikely that federalism
arguments will invalidate plaintiffs' challenges to discriminatory
state laws.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STATE'S DENIAL
OF EQUAL ACCESS TO A DEAF LITIGANT
It is not likely that states will choose to voluntarily comply
with the requirements of Title II of the ADA by amending their
statutes to require the provision and payment of interpreters for
all deaf litigants. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has
required state courts to provide accessible forums for individuals
with disabilities for almost twenty years; most states, however,
still have not complied willingly.55 Title II of the ADA took
effect January 26, 1992, and yet, to date, the majority of states
have not modified their laws to require court-appointed inter-
jurisdiction in state affairs was an inappropriate interference with the state's
operation of its institutions. The court held that federal jurisdiction was
proper and, citing Moe v. Brookings, 659 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1981), stated that
"cases involving questions of civil rights are the least likely candidates for
abstention." Olson, 713 F.2d at 1391. Furthermore, the court held that the
district court's order was permissible as it only required state officials to
develop a program, and that "this [could] hardly be classified as an unrea-
sonable intrusion into professional judgment." Id. at 1392.
51 Id.
52 No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
' See supra note 8.
4 See supra text accompanying note 49. See also Herrold v. Duckett, No.
92-CV-1698 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 1992).
" See State Interpreter Law Summary, supra note 6.
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preters at state expense. 56 The resistance of states to bring
their laws into compliance places the burden on deaf individuals
to force such compliance by litigation. Deaf persons must
challenge those discriminatory state laws through actual "cases
or controversies"5 in order to receive equal access to the judi-
cial system.5"
A. REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE ADA
Title II section 203 of the ADA specifies the remedies
available to an individual bringing a discrimination claim.59 A
litigant who challenges a state law as discriminatory has a
private right of action for three kinds of relief: an injunction, a
declaratory judgment, or damages.
A deaf individual seeking to enforce Title II to ensure the
provision of paid interpreter services in a state court may bring
an action in federal court challenging the state law.60 The
exact nature of the discrimination lawsuit and the relief sought
will depend largely on the stage of the litigation in the underly-
ing civil suit. There are three possible scenarios in the timing
of the commencement of the underlying suit in relation to the
federal discrimination suit.
First, if the underlying civil suit has not yet begun, the deaf
litigant may seek a declaratory judgment or an injunction in
federal court by arguing that the state law discriminates
5 6
1d.
57 U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2.
" Under § 502 of the ADA, the doctrine of state immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment is abrogated:
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution... from an action in (footnote omitted) Federal or
State court... for a violation of this chapter. In any action against
a State for a violation of the requirements of this Chapter, remedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such
a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for
such a violation in an action against any public or private entity
other than a State." 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (Supp. H 1990).
5 The ADA adopts the remedial scheme set forth in § 794(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988), which adopted the
remedial scheme of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d-2000h (1988).
0 See Avraham v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa.
1991); Herrold v. Duckett, No. 92-CV-1698 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 1992).
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against deaf litigants by failing to guarantee paid interpreter
services.6' In response, the state may claim that the federal
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issue since the underlying
suit has not yet begun in state court and therefore no actual
"case or controversy" exists. 2 If the state's argument succeeds,
the deaf litigant may be forced to commence the underlying suit
in state court before bringing a discrimination claim under Title
II of the ADA. Moreover, in the underlying claim, the deaf
litigant must request an interpreter at the state's expense.64
If the state denies this request on the grounds that state law
does not require an interpreter for civil matters, only then may
the deaf litigant seek an injunction from the federal court to
enjoin the state court from enforcing its discriminatory practic-
es, as well as a declaratory judgment that the state law violates
the ADA.65
Second, the deaf litigant may bring the federal discrimina-
tion suit after the underlying state civil proceeding has begun.
If she chooses this option, however, the litigant must consider
before filing suit whether she can afford to pay for an inter-
preter if the state court refuses to do so, since she may ulti-
mately be burdened with interpreter costs if the federal suit is
unsuccessful. The deaf litigant may also be forced to seek an
injunction against the same judge hearing her underlying
case. 6' This may create problems of bias and prejudice against
the litigant.
Third, a deaf litigant may commence a discrimination suit
after the final decision of the underlying civil proceeding has
61 The state may argue that such a judgment would violate principles of
federalism and comity and that the federal court should not be permitted to
interfere in state court procedure. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Depending on the presence of federal funding, the claims may also be
brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
6 State Interpreter Laws Summary, supra note 6.
' See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (discussing limitations on
federal courts and noting that an advisory opinion does not constitute a
justiciable question); Lane v. Reid, 559 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(explaining the necessity of an actual, not hypothetical, case or controversy).
' See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity
does not extend to injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983). Because
some state statutes leave the assessment of interpreter fees to the discretion
of the judge, the judge, as well as the state and/or county, may be a viable
defendant.
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been rendered. After fully litigating the initial civil claim, the
litigant could subsequently sue the state, county, and state
judge for declaratory relief and monetary damages, including
damages for discrimination." Alternatively, the deaf litigant
could pay the interpreter fees under protest and later sue the
state or local entity under the ADA. Such a strategy still may
not guarantee equal access to the state judicial system. If the
action is brought after the resolution of the underlying civil
claim, the state will likely argue that the resolution has ren-
dered the federal issue moot.' Although most federal courts
agree that requests for declaratory relief are not mooted by later
circumstances if the declaratory judgment is predicate to a
claim for damages,69 not all requests for declaratory relief are
accompanied by requests for damages.
While it appears that Title II enforcement claims have the
best chance for relief if brought after the resolution of the
underlying claim, a deaf litigant faces risks at any point, and a
federal court may decide to dismiss the case regardless of the
status of the underlying claim.7 °
' Under the judicial immunity doctrine, judges may not be held personally
liable for their judicial actions. While the ADA provides that the Eleventh
Amendment will not serve to immunize the states from enforcement of the
ADA, it is unclear whether judicial immunity will apply to the individual
decisions of state judges who act under color of state law. See generally
Mireless v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991); Timothy M. Parks, Note, Stump v.
Sparkman Revisited: The State of Judicial Immunity After Mireless v. Waco,
28 WILLAMETE L. REV. 625 (1992).
' See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (commenting on the
necessity of a 'live' issue); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631
(1979) (detailing the conditions for determining if a case is moot).
9 See Winsett v. McGinnes 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981).
70 Even if a deaf litigant receives a favorable declaratory judgment,
practical difficulties may arise in enforcing the judgment. For example, in the
criminal setting, if the state refuses to pay interpreter fees, a criminal
conviction cannot be enforced. In a civil case, however, if a state court asserts
that financial restraints prevent it from paying for the interpreter's services,
how can the federal declaratory judgment be enforced? For one possible
solution, see Kroll v. St. Charles County, Mo. 766 F. Supp. 744, 753 (E.D. Mo.
1991) ('[A] District Court may have the authority to order a property tax
increase after exploring every other fiscal alternative.").
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B. SPECIAL IsSUES REGARDING INJUNCTvE REMEDIES
Assuming the federal case survives dismissal as a threshold
matter, deaf litigants may face additional problems in attempt-
ing to obtain injunctions against state judicial systems. If
successful, an injunction could compel a state court to provide a
state-paid interpreter for an individual deaf litigant as well as
all future deaf litigants. In attempting to protect themselves
against such injunctions, states may invoke the Federal Anti-
Injunction Act as well as the doctrines of federalism and comity,
claiming (1) if litigants can obtain these kinds of relief from a
federal court, the state court would be divested of its judicial
independence to try a claim within its jurisdiction; and (2) that
the state appellate courts would also be deprived of their proper
role. Although such arguments have not been successful in the
EAHCA cases,7 it is not clear how persuasive they will be in
the state court context. However, if preliminary indications
may be relied upon, it appears that these arguments will not be
fatal to discrimination claims.72
Distinctions exist between injunctions designed to apply to
entire "systems" (e.g., courts, police, etc.), and injunctions
applicable only to single cases. System-wide injunctions have
the capacity to provide more straightforward and comprehensive
relief to deaf litigants than injunctions in individual cases
because system-wide injunctions have the potential to provide
relief from discriminatory state laws for all potential deaf
litigants. However, system-wide injunctions correspondingly
bring about the most serious challenges from the states. The
potential hurdles are federalism, comity, and the Federal Anti-
Injunction Act, as well as the requirement of proving that the
state court judge's conduct resulted in a denial of the right to
services. If the deaf litigant clears these hurdles, the second
requirement is not as difficult to meet. Most state statutes
leave the decision of assessing interpreter costs to the presiding
judge's discretion7 3 and thus the judge's decision can be said
to directly cause the denial of the right to an interpreter.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
72 Avraham v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
7 State Interpreter Laws Summary, supra note 6; Pulliam v. Allen, 468
U.S. 522 (1984).
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In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,74
the Supreme Court allowed a system-wide injunction remedy
because the segregation imposed by law had been implemented
by state authorities, as distinguished from when "responsible
authorities played no a ative... [role] in depriving...
[respondents] of any constitutional rights."'75 Consequently, if
responsible authorities deny litigants their rights by administra-
tive conduct, courts may decide that a system-wide injunction is
appropriate relief.76
An alternative strategy to a system-wide injunction is a
single-case injunction against the state.77 A state may argue
that enjoining enforcement of a state statute violates the Feder-
al Anti-Injunction Act." The Anti-Injunction Act applies only
after a state statute has been challenged by a litigant asking a
federal court for declaratory or injunctive relief.79 While Con-
gress has expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act,"0 it has not declared actions brought under the ADA's
remedial scheme as such an exception. Therefore, states may
attempt to invoke the Anti-Injunction Act as a defense against
being compelled to change their rules of court.
The Anti-Injunction Act, however, only expressly prohibits
injunctions that stay state court proceedings.8 ' A deaf litigant
attempting to obtain paid interpreter services generally does not
desire a stay of a state court proceeding. The litigant's goal is
7 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976).
7 But cf O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (holding that an
injunction "aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events
that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials" would not
be granted).
7 With a single-case injunction, federalism arguments may prove to be less
compelling, since the relief sought in the federal proceeding is less comprehen-
sive.
78Kroll v. St. Charles County, Mo., 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
States will likely argue that a federal court providing declaratory relief
is as violative of the Anti-Injunction Act as an injunction itself. See
Cunningham v. A.J. Aberman, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 602, (W.D. Pa. 1965), affd,
358 F.2d 747 (3d. Cir. 1966); Garrett v. Hoffman, 441 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
' For example, the Supreme Court has held that claims under § 1983 fall
within the "expressly authorized Act of Congress" exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
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to further the state civil action with an interpreter provided at
state expense. Furthermore, in order to avoid any potential
conflict with the Anti-Injunction Act, a litigant may attempt to
direct the injunction toward the judicial official acting under
that state statute, rather than against the statute itself.8 2
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING THE
PROVISION OF PAID INTERPRETER SERVICES
The first two sections of this article addressed the legal
obligations of Title II of the ADA and the possible mechanisms
for enforcement. Compelling policy rationales also exist for
requiring state courts to provide and pay for interpreters for
deaf persons participating in civil suits.
For individuals who do not communicate through an ex-
change of spoken language, an interpreter is a necessity. A deaf
individual who uses a signed language will need the services of
a qualified interpreter in order to translate the meaning of
spoken words into sign language and translate the signed
messages into English for the hearing participants. This is
particularly important in a courtroom because of the serious
nature of the communication and the need for complete under-
standing, as well as the fact that many legal terms will be
unfamiliar to a deaf individual whose first language is not
English. 3 Additionally, a court proceeding is an oral process.
Unlike written transcripts, an interpreter provides more than a
simple translation of words into signs; an interpreter conveys
important tones and secondary meanings of words that are
82 If a litigant attempts to get an injunction through a § 1983 action, the
state may raise judicial immunity as a defense. See Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969). A defense of judicial
immunity, however, is not limited to § 1983 actions.
' Most people learn their native language by hearing it spoken around
them from infancy, but a person who is born deaf or who loses the ability to
hear when very young cannot learn English this way. Therefore, despite
normal intelligence, a deaf individual may have limited competence in English.
For such people, English is virtually a second language. They may have a
limited English vocabulary and grammar, a condition that can lead to numer-
ous misunderstandings. The extensive use of idioms in English also poses
significant reading problems for deaf people. For example, the expression
"under arrest" in the Miranda warnings would be confusing to many deaf
individuals because "under" to them means only "beneath." DUBOW et al.,
supra note 3, at 6.
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necessary for the deaf litigant to fully understand and partici-
pate in the litigation process.
Due to the widespread misconception that all deaf people
can lip-read, a question may still arise about the need for
interpreters. However, very few deaf people can read lips well
enough to understand speech, as even the best lip-readers in a
one-on-one situation can only understand 26% of what is spo-
ken." Even if a deaf individual is an exceptionally skilled lip-
reader, some meanings cannot be assumed simply by examining
the context of the communication, especially in a forum as
complex and unfamiliar as a courtroom proceeding.85 Addition-
ally, there are many situations in which lip-reading can be more
difficult - for example, when the speaker does not articulate
carefully or has a regional or foreign accent; when the lips are
obscured by a beard or mustache; or when the speaker is not
well-lighted, is in motion, or is not directly facing the lip-read-
er.
8 6
Many perceive the use of written communication as an ade-
quate alternative to the use of interpretive aides. However,
written conversations may be tedious, cumbersome, and time
consuming, and the writer may omit much of the information
that would otherwise be exchanged so that the deaf person does
not get the same amount of detail as a hearing person. 7 An-
other problem with using written notes as a means of communi-
cating is the different levels of educational experience and
ability to comprehend written material across the deaf popula-
tion.88 Many deaf people, especially those for whom hearing
4Id. at 5 (quoting EUGENE MINDEL & MCOAY VERNON, THEY GROW IN
SILENCE: THE DEAF CHILD AND His FAMILY (1971)). This low level of compre-
hension occurs because many English speech sounds are not visible on the
mouth or lips. Certain spoken words or sounds create similar lip movements,
making it difficult to distinguish between words. Lip-reading, however, is not
impossible. There are some oral deaf individuals who do not use any of the
manual languages and who are able to successfully use lip-reading to receive
information. See HENRY KISOR, WHAT'S THAT PIG OUTDOORS? (1990).
' The ambiguity of lip-reading is demonstrated by the fact that the
sounds of T, D, Z, S, and N all look identical on the lips. The words "right,"
"ride," and "rise" would be indistinguishable to a deaf person. The meaning of
entire sentences can be lost because a key word is misunderstood. DuBow et
al., supra note 3, at 7.
8 Id. at 7.
8
"
7 d. at 2.
' See McCay Vernon & Joan Coley, Violation of Constitutional Rights:
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has been absent since birth or lost in infancy before language
was acquired, have difficulty understanding written English. 9
For these prelingually deaf people, some form of manual com-
munication is usually the first language and English is a second
language.9" Consequently, written communication is unlikely
to give a deaf participant the same level of understanding that
a hearing person enjoys.91
Clearly, requiring a deaf individual to lip-read courtroom
proceedings or to participate in written exchanges are unsatis-
factory options because they fail to provide the deaf person with
equal access to the court. Without providing for equal opportu-
The Language Impaired Person and the Miranda Warnings, AMERICAN
ANNALS OF THE DEAF Vol. II No. 4 (April 1978). Additionally, only about 10%
of prelingually deaf adults read at a 6.0 grade level or above. Id. at 3.
89 SACKS, supra note 4, at 7, 12.
' Dr. Oliver Sacks describes prelingually deaf people as being in a
category that is "qualitatively different from all others. Id. at 7. "[T]o be born
deaf is infinitely more serious than to be born blind - at least potentially so.
The prelingually deaf, unable to hear their parents, risk being severely
retarded, if not permanently defective, in their grasp of language unless early
and effective measures are taken." Id. at 8.
These effective measures often include the learning of a manual lan-
guage, which becomes the child's first language. Although some deaf signers
use Signed English or Signed Exact English, many more use American Sign
Language ("ASL"). ASL has a grammatical structure that is considerably
different from English, and many deaf people do not acquire English grammar
and syntax easily. Consequently, interpreters familiar with the entire range
of language capabilities must be available to deaf people in order to ensure
effective communication. See DUBOW et al, supra note 3, at 2.
" The hearing world has failed to truly recognize American Sign Language
as being linguistically independent of English. If a native Spanish speaker
were involved in a court proceeding and he was not familiar with the use of
English, he would not become more familiar if conversations were written
rather than spoken. Yet this is the exact assumption made by many hearing
people in their attempts to have deaf persons communicate through an
exchange of written notes. The failure of the use of written material as an
adequate substitute for an interpreter becomes clearer when examined in the
criminal context. Evidence places the reading level of the Miranda warning at
sixth to eighth grade. Thus, deaf individuals who read English at lower levels
may not understand the warning when it is given to them in writing, and in
that sense, cannot be said to have been given the warning at all. This
problem is not limited to the criminal setting, but extends to any setting
involving complex language and concepts. Vernon & Coley, supra note 88, at
3. Although many deaf individuals do not have high English reading compre-
hension levels, this simply reflects the fact that ASL, rather than English, is
their first language.
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nity to understand the proceedings, it is impossible to truly
satisfy the demands of justice.
State and local courts claim that deaf litigants have access
to their court systems because the courts do not prohibit them
from filing actions and appearing in court. However, the dis-
crimination here is more invidious. It is "comparable to opening
a courtroom door at the top of a flight of steps, or opening a
door of an inaccessible bus, and saying disingenuously to a
person in a wheelchair, 'You may come in.' 92 State and local
courts have not met their responsibility to deaf individuals
simply by claiming that their courts are open and available.
This statement must be made meaningful by making necessary
and reasonable accommodations, including the provision of
interpreter services.
Unlike other civil rights laws, the ADA does not and
cannot have as its goal simply to provide identical treatment to
all members of society. In the case of disability, identical
treatment is inherently discriminatory because it prevents equal
access. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has
identified two types of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities: intentional and unintentional discrimination.93
The Commission describes unintentional discrimination as
existing "when handicapped people cannot participate-in servic-
es, programs and activities because of barriers that were not
consciously constructed to have such an effect.... Although not
motivated by ill will or conscious efforts to keep out handi-
capped people, these barriers exclude just as surely as deliber-
ate prohibitions do."94 If the goal of equal rights is to be met,
it must be accomplished through the affirmative elimination of
barriers, both physical and communicative.95
92 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss of Defen-
dants at 11, Avraham v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
93 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDivDUAL ABILrmEs 41 (1983).
9 Id.
5 The Commission further asserts:
If handicapped people cannot take full advantage of an opportunity,
however, its value and effectiveness are diminished for them.
Allowing a deaf person to attend a speech or other oral presentation
may appear to be equal treatment, for instance, but without an
interpreter or some captioning process, the presentation may be less
effective for the deaf person than for the rest of the audience.
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Having established that interpreter services are necessary,
the focus of the question shifts to who should pay for the servic-
es. State and local courts may argue that requiring a deaf
individual to pay for services does not equal a denial of partici-
pation because their laws guarantee the presence of an inter-
preter during the proceeding. However, since the central
purpose of both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is to pro-
vide equal access, this argument is not persuasive. Access is not
equal if some members of society must pay for it while others
are not required to do so. A deaf litigant should not be obligat-
ed, as a condition to bringing an action in a state court system,
to hire and pay for a sign language interpreter before her case
comes to trial,96 yet some judicial systems have deemed this
scenario to constitute "equal access."9"
Accessibility is part of the overall expense of operating a
courtroom. To view accessibility as 'costs' to be imposed on
selected members of society is inherently discriminatory.98
When a litigant in a wheelchair needs physical access to a
courtroom, the state does not assess the expense of installing
and maintaining a ramp or an elevator as part of the costs of
the proceeding to be paid by that litigant.9 Interpreters pro-
vide comparable access to court proceedings for deaf litigants.
Courts should not "punish" deaf individuals because they re-
quire interpreter services instead of structural accommodations
in order to have meaningful access to the court system. If the
state provides an interpreter to a deaf litigant, only to subse-
96 A lack of financial resources, high legal fees, and a dearth of public
interest attorneys create obstacles for many potential litigants. This situation,
although troubling, should not be compared to the situation of a deaf individu-
al unable to bring a lawsuit due to financial inability to pay for an interpreter.
While some civil rights laws promise equal results, all guarantee equal access.
Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled,
74 GEO. L.J. 1371 (1986).
" In Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 289 (2nd Cir. 1990), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a school
district violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when it refused to provide a
sign language interpreter at school district expense to deaf parents so they
could participate in school conferences. The district court concluded in the
same case, "meaningful access may mean more than accommodation for a
privately retained sign language interpreter." Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 716
F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
98 Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 12, Avraham
v. Zaffarano, No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
9 Id.
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quently charge the deaf person for the service as part of "court
costs," the litigant does not receive equal access.
A related argument for providing interpreters for deaf
litigants at state expense can be drawn by analogy from those
state laws providing that the state or county furnish foreign
language interpreters at their own expense for non-English
speaking litigants. For example, Massachusetts and New York
State statutes provide for paid interpreter services for non-
English speaking litigants."°  A deaf individual unable to
communicate through spoken English has at least an equally
compelling claim for paid interpreter services as a non-English
speaking individual.
Finally, states have also argued that if a deaf litigant were
to prevail in her case, the sign language interpreter fees could
be levied upon the opposing party. However, the deaf individual
may not prevail, and even if she does, state statutes frequently
provide that a judge still has discretion in the allocation of
costs. The deaf individual should not be put in a position where
she must decide before filing suit whether it is worth the risk to
hire and pay for a sign language interpreter.
The case of Avraham v. Zaffarano,'0 ' which involved a
small claims suit brought by a deaf man over a contract dispute
for the sum of $175, exemplifies this point. The $175 fee that
Mr. Avraham alleged was due him was important enough to
him that he was willing to bring the case to court. To require
him to pay his own interpreter fees would essentially exhaust
whatever award he might have won, 10 2 and if he had lost his
case, would have caused him to incur further financial losses for
the sole purpose of gaining meaningful access to the justice
system. The fact that interpreter costs might be assessed
against Mr. Avraham or other deaf persons may have the effect
of discouraging deaf individuals from using judicial remedies to
redress grievances.
There simply cannot exist thorough and effective communi-
cation between deaf and hearing participants in a court proceed-
ing without an interpreter. The interpreter is not simply an aid
to the deaf litigant in the court proceeding, but rather an aid to
the proceedings as a whole, in that the interpreter functions to
'o MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 221C § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L & R 3114 (McKinney 1991).
101 No. 90-4759, 1991 WL 147541 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
102 The underlying small claim was settled in this case.
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facilitate communication between deaf and hearing individuals.
To require a deaf person to pay for the understanding that is
needed for all participants in a legal proceeding is patently
discriminatory. The responsibility to eliminate communication
barriers constitutes a necessary element of court accessibility.
States must assume this responsibility if the legal system is to
provide meaningful access to all members of society.
CONCLUSION
Upon signing the ADA into law, President Bush stated:
The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all
with an historic opportunity. It signals the end to the
unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As
the Declaration of Independence has been a beacon for
people all over the world seeking freedom, it is my hope
that the Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise
come to be a model for the choices and opportunities of
future generations around the world.
103
It is now incumbent upon states to make this inspiring state-
ment, and the ADA, meaningful by giving individuals with
disabilities access to their justice systems. Simply opening
doors to these individuals is not enough to guarantee access.
State courts, like other branches of state and local governments,
now have an affirmative obligation to provide the accommoda-
tions that will enable individuals with disabilities to fully
participate in the mainstream of American life.
Laura L. Rovnert
103 Statement by George Bush upon signing the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336. 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990).
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